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ARTICLES 
A LIGHT UNSEEN: THE HISTORY OF 
CATHOLIC LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A RESPONSE TO OUR 
COLLEAGUES AND CRITICS 
JOHN M. BREEN & LEE J. STRANG† 
INTRODUCTION 
We are enormously grateful to the Journal of Catholic Legal 
Studies for hosting the conference on February 14, 2020, 
dedicated to a review of our book manuscript, A Light Unseen: 
The History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States, and 
for publishing the papers of the conference participants.1  We are 
also grateful for the opportunity to offer some reply in the pages 
of the Journal.  A Light Unseen sets forth a comprehensive 
history of the book’s subject matter.  The book describes the 
purposes for which Catholic law schools were founded, the 
schools maturation and success in achieving accreditation and 
some measure of respectability,2 and their search for meaning 
since the 1960s-1970s when the prior unreflective cultural 
Catholicism of these schools dissipated and in some cases 
disappeared almost entirely.  A Light Unseen’s last chapter 
provides a blueprint for the creation of authentically Catholic 
legal education grounded in the Catholic intellectual tradition.  
In particular, we argue that Catholic law schools reach their 
fullest expression when their teaching, scholarship, and student 
formation—their intellectual hearts—employ the Catholic 
intellectual tradition and its moral anthropology. 
 
† John M. Breen, Georgia Reithal Professor of law, Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law; Lee J. Strang, John W. Stoepler Professor of Law & Values, 
University of Toledo College of Law.   
1 Editors Anthony Nania and Matt Dean, along with Journal advisors 
Professors DeGirolami and Movsesian, performed yeoman’s labor conceiving and 
executing the Symposium, and we express our heartfelt thanks to them for their 
efforts. 
2 Those four purposes were to: (1) provide means of upward socio-economic 
mobility for Catholic immigrants and their children; (2) provide resources and 
university status to the law schools’ host institutions; (3) train attorneys for the local 
bar; and rarely, (4) provide a distinctively Catholic legal education. 
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I.  AUTHENTIC CATHOLIC LEGAL EDUCATION—BOTH IN PRINCIPLE 
AND IN PRACTICE—CAN THRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The comments from the conference participants were wide-
ranging, thoughtful, critical in a constructive fashion, and almost 
always charitable.3  Most of the commentators’ remarks focused 
on Chapter 5 of A Light Unseen, where we set forth a prescription 
for authentic Catholic legal education.  This is understandable 
 
3 There are two instances where we believe the commentators’ significantly 
misread our arguments and, in doing so, paint our arguments in an unnecessarily 
harsh light. 
First, Dean Vischer claims that the manuscript “convey[s] a rather 
dismissive attitude toward Catholic law schools’ embrace of clinical legal education 
as a case of bandwagon jumping.” Robert K. Vischer, How Distinctive Should 
Catholic Law Schools Be?, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 117, 118 (2019). With respect, 
we are in no way dismissive of the excellent legal work and education provided at 
legal clinics sponsored by Catholic law schools. Indeed, we have elsewhere argued 
that, in a Catholic setting, a law clinic can convey to the law student the basic 
Christian truth about the Incarnation—that every human being is made in the 
image and likeness of God, and even the poorest of the poor is simply Christ “in [a] 
distressing disguise.” See MOTHER TERESA, IN THE HEART OF THE WORLD: 
THOUGHTS, STORIES & PRAYERS, 23 (Becky Benenate ed., 2010). Rather, our point is 
a historical one, made in response to the false claim that the clinics at Catholic law 
schools were mission-driven in their origin, reflecting a desire to further manifest 
their Catholic identity. We are not dismissive of clinical legal education. We are, on 
historical grounds, dismissive of the claim that these clinics were of Catholic 
inspiration. 
Second, Dean Treanor claims that there is a “logical flaw” in our view of 
Catholic legal education. William Michael Treanor, Reflections on a More “Catholic” 
Catholic Legal Education, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100 (2019). Treanor claims 
that, on the one hand, we argue that because Catholic law schools “are not 
advancing access [for disadvantaged students] or pursuing justice very well” that 
this aspect of the mission should be abandoned, but that, on the other hand, even 
though Catholic law schools “are not very good at teaching the Catholic intellectual 
tradition” that “we should redouble our efforts.” Id. “This,” he says, “is inconsistent.” 
Id. The problem with this argument is that we nowhere argue that Catholic law 
schools should abandon their efforts to make legal education accessible to those who 
are disadvantaged. We acknowledge the laudable history of Catholic law schools 
providing Catholic immigrants and others with the opportunity for professional 
education and advancement. John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A 
History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States 468–69 (Jan. 20, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the St. John’s Law Review). However, 
because of the cost of legal education today and the financial position of most 
Catholic law schools, we think it is unlikely that these schools will be able to 
replicate this aspect of their past, creating opportunities for large numbers of 
economically disadvantaged students. We do not argue that the goal is not worth 
pursuing, only that it may not be realistic. We do argue that, even if Catholic law 
schools were to succeed in making legal education more accessible, they, 
nevertheless, will have failed in their mission if the education they provide students 
is indistinguishable from their secular counterpoints. Id. There is no inconsistency 
in what we argue. 
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because the symposium participants are actively engaged in the 
project of Catholic legal education—some for many  decades.  
Indeed, the commentators regularly noted how impactful their 
own experiences of Catholic education have been in their lives.   
In Part I of this Response, we address four major themes in 
the commentators’ essays: (1) the idea that authentic Catholic 
legal education can be defined entirely or for the most part by 
characteristics shared with non-Catholic institutions; (2) the 
claim that many or most Catholic law schools today are 
authentically Catholic in their mission, curricula, programming, 
and culture; (3) the claim that Catholic law schools that 
intentionally embrace the Catholic intellectual tradition as a 
defining feature will curtail the exercise of academic freedom; 
and (4) the prediction that our prescription for authentic Catholic 
legal education will be unattainable due to a lack of qualified 
faculty and insufficient student demand to meet sustainable 
enrollments. 
A. Defining What It Means to Be a Catholic Law School, and the 
Need to Be Distinctive 
A premise that underlies all of the essays, both critical and 
positive, is that there is a distinction between Catholic and non-
Catholic legal education.  However, if the concept of “Catholic 
legal education” is to be meaningful, and so have practical effect, 
it must be defined.  The thesis we advance in the book is that, as 
part of a university, every law school is an intellectual enterprise.  
As such, a Catholic law school’s Catholic identity must be 
reflected in the intellectual work that it performs in teaching, 
scholarship, and student formation.  We argue that no matter 
how many crucifixes adorn its walls, no matter how active its 
campus ministry, no matter how lyrical and effusive its claimed 
commitment to “social justice,” a Catholic law school must be 
counted as failing in its mission if the Catholic intellectual 
tradition is not reflected in its heart—in the center of its 
intellectual operations. 
Of course, the Catholic intellectual tradition is enormous in 
scope, spanning two millennia of thought, research, reflection, 
and argument, and involving every discipline and field of inquiry, 
from art and architecture, to literature and criticism, history and 
science, law and politics, philosophy and theology.  We argue that 
the one aspect of this vast tradition that a Catholic law school 
must integrate into its intellectual life and introduce to its 
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students, if it is to fulfill its mission, is the Church’s moral 
anthropology. 
A number of the commentators explicitly agree with this 
thesis.  Dean Vincent Rougeau says that our “idea of placing the 
Catholic anthropology of the human person at the core of what a 
Catholic law school does . . . strikes me as an essential part of the 
institutional architecture of a Catholic law school.”4  Professor 
Richard Garnett agrees that a Catholic law school must hold a 
Christian moral anthropology at its center, “that is, an account of 
what it means to be human, why it matters that we are, and 
what it means for our lives together.”5  Likewise, Dean Robert 
Vischer endorses the idea of a “Catholic anthropology [serving] as 
a counterpoint to materialist/determinist theories.”6   
Several of the manuscript commentators also expressly agree 
with the obvious and unobjectionable claim that Catholic legal 
education must be defined.  Thus, Dean Kathleen Boozang sets 
forth her “vision of a Catholic law school” as one that is “founded 
upon the Catholic intellectual tradition embraced by a diverse 
community of faculty, staff, and administration”; one that 
accomplishes a “pervasive embrace of our intellectual tradition 
by both indirect and direct inculcation”; and one that “serve[s] as 
an intellectual hub for the Church.”7 
Professor Angela Carmella answers the question of a law 
school’s Catholic identity more modestly through a via negativa.  
According to Carmella, “[a] law school is not the Church, just as a 
university is not the Church,” and “[l]aw faculty scholarship does 
 
4 Vincent Rougeau, Reflections on A Light Unseen, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 89, 
95 (2019). 
5 Richard W. Garnett, Persons and the Point of the Law, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL 
STUD. 65, 69–70 (2019). 
6 Vischer, supra note 3, at 120–21. Dean Vischer adds, however, that Catholic 
law schools “would also benefit from having materialist/determinist theories 
presented as a counterpoint to the Catholic anthropology.” Id. As the manuscript 
makes plain, we believe that every idea should be open to consideration at a Catholic 
university, and that would include the ancient and modern anthropologies founded 
on materialism and determinism. But introducing students to these theories is not 
the challenge. They are a pervasive and inescapable part of American intellectual 
life, including the study of law. It would be odd to think that law students today at 
every law school in the country are not already inundated with these theories, both 
in their study of law, and in the popular culture they inhabit. These theories are the 
baseline to which a Catholic anthropology stands as a needed alternative and 
antidote. 
7 Kathleen M. Boozang, A Light Unseen?, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 5, 7 (2019). 
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not need a theologian’s nihil obstat or a bishop’s imprimatur.”8  
Here, it seems, Carmella identifies “the Church” with the 
Church’s hierarchy.  Certainly, a Catholic law school is not 
identical with the Church in this respect, but the same could be 
said of any lay person or organization.  Even this minimal, 
negative definition is inadequate, however, in that every Catholic 
individual and institution—be it a school, a university, a 
hospital, a soup kitchen, or a cemetery—belongs to and is part of 
the Church.  Thus, when individuals and institutions ostensibly 
identify themselves as “Catholic” and simultaneously 
“independent” of the Church, they are contradicting themselves,9 
since the fact of belonging to the Church—of being Catholic—is a 
matter of communion, which is the antithesis of independence.10   
Although Dean Vischer agrees with our thesis “that the 
intellectual dimension of Catholic legal education is crucial,” he 
worries that it fails to “capture[ ] fully the potential 
distinctiveness of Catholic legal education” and that we give 
undue weight to “intellectual distinctives.”11  Following Pope 
John Paul II, Vischer says that a Catholic law school must be “an 
authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ.”12  
He identifies five qualities that distinguish Catholic legal 
education including the “centrality of relationships,” the 
“integration of a student’s faith commitments with his or her 
professional development,” and “help[ing] a student develop a 
sense of vocation.”13  These too are laudable goals, but not 
specifically Catholic goals.   
What Vischer sees as the undue weight we give to the 
Catholic intellectual tradition in the study of law is owing to the 
woeful neglect of this tradition in the practice of Catholic legal 
 
8 Angela C. Carmella, Reflections on Breen & Strang’s A Light Unseen: A 
History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 
15, 20 (2019). 
9 See, e.g., Mission and Values, NAT'L CATH. REP., https://www.ncronline.org 
/mission-and-values [https://perma.cc/RUF7-BQLB] (last visited July 1, 2021) 
(describing itself as an independent news source and as “connect[ing] Catholics to 
church, faith and the common good with independent news, analysis and spiritual 
reflection”). 
10 See generally CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, ON SOME 
ASPECTS OF THE CHURCH UNDERSTOOD AS COMMUNION (1992), http://www.vatican.va 
/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_28051992_communi
onis-notio_en.html [https://perma.cc/KZF9-M8AE]. 
11 Vischer, supra note 3, at 119. 
12 Id. (quoting JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE ¶ 
21 (1990)). 
13 Id. 
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education since the 1960s to the current day.  Our emphasis on 
the intellectual tradition is not meant to “capture[ ] fully the 
potential distinctiveness of Catholic legal education.”14  Rather, 
we stress engagement with the tradition as a necessary 
component of legal education that every Catholic law school must 
perform precisely because the study of law is an intellectual 
enterprise.  But it is not sufficient.  To fulfill its mission, a 
Catholic law school should, for example, help its students develop 
a sense of vocation and see the centrality of relationships in both 
education and the practice of law.  But even if these activities are 
carried out in superb fashion, they could not obviate the need for 
engagement with the tradition, for this is indispensable.  
Of course, to say that a certain quality is necessary 
establishes a boundary around the thing defined.  According to 
Dean Vischer, this sort of “ ‘in or out’ line drawing loom[s] large” 
in our project.15  It reminds him of the Evangelical Christianity of 
his youth which suffered from the same “preoccupation with line 
drawing.”16  He colorfully contrasts Evangelical support for “the 
decidedly mediocre Christian metal band Stryper rather than the 
unmistakably non-Christian but brilliant Metallica” as an 
example of ignoring what is excellent in favor of what is 
identifiably Christian.17  He contrasts this with a Catholic 
perspective which, he says, is less concerned with the “ ‘in or out’ 
question” and more concerned with whether a thing contributes 
to “the true, the good, and the beautiful.”18 
There indeed is such a thing as an obsession with line-
drawing—placing something in or out of a given category—that 
prevents one from appreciating the good qualities that the thing 
under examination possesses.  Surely, however, Vischer would 
agree that some line drawing is both inevitable and desirable, if 
only to avoid fraud.  There are many lovely sparkling wines made 
in Italy and France, but prosecco and champagne are not the 
same thing, and it would be false to claim otherwise.  The term 
“Catholic” must have some boundaries, otherwise the term is 
meaningless.  Dean Vischer, of course, recognizes this fact.  He 
depends on the very line drawing he bemoans in promoting his 
own institution, the University of St. Thomas School of Law, as 
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 118. 
16 Id. at 117. 
17 Id. at 118. 
18 Id. at 117. 
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“a Catholic law school.”19  In doing so, he means, at least in part, 
to distinguish St. Thomas from non-Catholic schools like the 
University of Minnesota and Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
that compete in the same market. 
Furthermore, Vischer’s analogy breaks down upon closer 
inspection.  It would be one thing for Metallica to say, “You 
should listen to our music because it is truly excellent heavy 
metal.”  It would be another thing for Metallica to say, “Oh, and 
by the way, our music is really Catholic.  This may not be 
apparent to you, but it is inherent in the quality of excellence 
that our music exudes.”  A law school may be truly excellent—in 
the breadth of its curriculum, the quality of its teaching, and in 
the insightful scholarship published by its faculty.  And these 
qualities should be appreciated, admired, and pursued.  But 
these qualities do not in themselves render a school “Catholic,” 
even if the school advertises itself as such.  Something more is 
required, and our book is in part an effort to define what this 
something more is.   
Dean Treanor also takes issue with boundary-drawing, 
though he expresses this concern in terms of pluralism.  
According to Treanor, we err in thinking “that there is only one 
type of Catholic law school.”20  Treanor proposes instead that, 
just as there are different religious orders within Catholicism 
possessing different charisms and methods of sharing the 
Gospel—Jesuits, Franciscans, and Benedictines—so too there are 
“equally valid paths to a Catholic education.”21  We should, he 
says, “be catholic about what it means to be a Catholic law 
school”22 as there are “diverse models and paths to arrive to a 
similar goal.”23 
But what is that goal?  Treanor doesn’t say.  Surely the goal 
of all law schools is to prepare law students to be competent and 
ethical members of the legal profession.  Beyond this, Dean 
Treanor indicates that what sets Catholic law schools apart (or at 
least Fordham and Georgetown, where he has taught) is that 
 
19 About St. Thomas Law, UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS SCH. OF L., https://www. 
stthomas.edu/law/about/ [https://perma.cc/ATA3-7N98] (last visited  July 1, 2021). 
20 Treanor, supra note 3, at 100. 
21 Id. at 102. 
22 Id. at 101. 
23 Id. at 104. Dean Rougeau echoes the same point. Rougeau, supra note 4, at 97 
(“I think the way [Breen and Strang] seek to define a law school as Catholic is one 
way, but it is not the only way.”). 
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they “are explicit in their commitment to justice.”24  He thinks it 
is significant that the motto for Georgetown University Law 
Center is “Law is but the means, – Justice is the end.”25  But an 
explicit commitment to justice certainly is not a sufficient marker 
of an authentic Catholic legal education.  Many non-Catholic law 
schools tell the world that their mission is to educate students for 
justice.  Northwestern’s former Dean Kim Yuracko assured 
prospective students that, while the Law School is a “community 
of scholars, advocates and activists” with diverse “backgrounds, 
interests and passions,” they are “alike in [their] belief that law 
is a force of social justice and the bedrock of a civilized society.”26  
One of Cornell Law School’s mission statement goals is that its 
graduates “[e]xercise with due care the role entrusted to them as 
officers of the legal system and public citizens, having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”27  Dean John Manning 
promotes Harvard Law School as “an exciting and productive 
community in which to study, to teach, to write, to debate, to 
explore, to question, to innovate, to litigate, to advocate, and to 
pursue the highest ideals of law and justice.”28  If mottos on 
libraries are evidence of Catholic legal education, as Dean 
Treanor suggests, then Langdell Hall’s—“Non sub Homine sed 
sub Deo et Lege,” is proof that Harvard is even more Catholic 
than Georgetown!29   
Furthermore, the meaning of “justice” is not self-evident.30  
Indeed, different people often mean radically different things by 
 
24 Treanor, supra note 3, at 101. 
25 Id. 
26 Kim Yuracko, Leadership and Strategy, NW PRITZKER SCH. OF L., 
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/about/leadership/ [http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20201126175413/https:/www.law.northwestern.edu/about/leadership/] (last visited 
June 30, 2021). 
27 Registrar’s Office, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ 
registrar/aba_standards.cfm [https://perma.cc/GM7M-28KW] (last visited July 1, 
2021). 
28 John F. Manning, Dean’s Welcome, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu 
/about/deans-welcome/ [https://perma.cc/2396-94PP] (last visited July 1, 2021); see 
also About, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/about/ [https://perma.cc/9DHB-
8QMU] (last visited July 1, 2021) (“With alumni and students as partners, they 
champion law as an instrument of positive change on scales local, regional, national 
and global.”). 
29 Langdell Hall, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/facilities/buildings-
overview/langdell-hall/ [https://perma.cc/F83K-ZGS9] (last visited July 1, 2021). 
30  See ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 1 
(1988) (describing how the West today contains a “set of conflicting conceptions of 
justice, conceptions which are strikingly at odds with one another”).   
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use of the word.  The content of this concept varies greatly 
depending upon the particular theory of justice employed and the 
application of that theory to a concrete set of facts.  It is in fact 
obvious that different views of justice can be employed to reach 
radically different conclusions with respect to highly contested 
issues of the day, like abortion.31  So Treanor’s assurance that 
Catholic law schools define themselves by commitment to an 
undefined variety of “justice” is inadequate. 
Contrary to Dean Treanor’s assertion, in the manuscript we 
do not contend that there is only one model for a Catholic law 
school.  On the contrary, we recognize that an authentically 
Catholic law school could take different forms.  At the same time, 
it is, of course, possible for one to be so “catholic” that one is no 
longer “Catholic.”  A Catholic law school could seek to serve the 
local community with practicing lawyers or to be counted among 
the country’s elite national law schools.32  A Catholic law school 
might stress public service or private practice, emphasize clinical 
and experiential learning over classroom instruction, or be 
recognized for a particular legal expertise such as environmental 
law, intellectual property, corporate transactions, poverty law, or 
the American Founding.33  Regardless of the model chosen, it is 
our claim that to be authentically Catholic, a law school must 
engage the Catholic intellectual tradition as it relates to 
questions of law and justice, specifically by introducing students 
to the Church’s moral anthropology.  Nowhere in any of the nine 
published responses is this basic claim explicitly rejected, let 
alone refuted.34 
Dean Treanor’s own model is “a Jesuit path” of “immersion 
in the world and an openness to discourse among people of 
different backgrounds and faiths.”35  We regard open discourse 
 
31 Compare DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 2–3 (2003), with FRANCIS 
J. BECKWITH, DEFENDING LIFE: A MORAL AND LEGAL CASE AGAINST ABORTION 
CHOICE xi–xiv (2007). 
32 Cf. Mark Tushnet, Catholic Legal Education at a National Law School: 
Reflections on the Georgetown Experience, in GEORGETOWN AT TWO HUNDRED: 
FACULTY REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSITY’S FUTURE 321, 321–22 (William C. 
McFadden ed., 1990) (arguing that Catholic law schools, insofar as they are Catholic, 
cannot be national law schools). 
33  See Columbus School of Law Receives $4.25 Million Gift, CATH. UNIV. AM. 
(Apr. 26, 2021), https://communications.catholic.edu/news/2021/04/law-originalism-
gift.html [https://perma.cc/3HTA-G3NQ].   
34 Even Treanor says that he “[does] not reject the model [we] offer.” Treanor, 
supra note 3, at 100. 
35 Id. at 102. 
10 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES  [Vol. 59:1   
among people from different backgrounds with disparate points 
of view not as a specifically Jesuit quality but as a trait common 
to all universities worthy of the name.  Still, Treanor’s model 
seems to us a reasonable approach that some, perhaps many, 
Catholic law schools should take—an approach that may easily 
fit under the broad umbrella of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition.  The key question, however, is whether Dean Treanor’s 
“Jesuit path” has a purpose and means that intentionally seeks 
to draw from the Catholic intellectual tradition to animate the 
intellectual work performed at law school.   
Related to the question of defining Catholic identity is the 
question of distinctiveness.  Dean Treanor believes that we focus 
too much on what we “see as ‘distinctive’ about a Catholic law 
school.”36  Instead, “we should embrace all the elements of our 
mission, even those that we share with non-Catholic schools.”37  
Thus, he argues that just because schools that are not Catholic 
“have strong commitments to justice and to access . . . does not 
mean that that these two commitments cannot also be hallmarks 
of the mission of a Catholic law school.”38  Dean Vischer likewise 
worries that for us “Catholic legal education matters only to the 
extent that it is distinctive.”39  He does “not want to unduly limit 
the worthy manifestations of Catholic identity to those 
manifestations that are not exhibited by non-Catholic law 
schools.”40 
This criticism is surprising since nowhere in the manuscript 
do we argue that the identity of a Catholic law school can only be 
found in those features “that are not exhibited by non-Catholic 
law schools.”41  It would be more accurate to say that we believe 
that legal education is not Catholic legal education unless it 
possesses certain qualities.  It may still be excellent legal 
education and so “matter” (to use Vischer’s term) in that sense, 
but it would not provide the light that a Catholic worldview is 
meant to bring to the study of law.  We agree that Catholic law 
schools should perform the aspects of their mission that they 
share with non-Catholic schools.  A quote, often attributed to 
Martin Luther, captures the point.  He is reported to have said 
 
36 Id. at 99. 
37 Id. at 100. 
38 Id. at 101. 
39 Vischer, supra note 3, at 118. 
40 Id. at 123. 
41 Id. 
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that if he were in need of medical attention he would rather have 
“an Infidel for a surgeon than a faithful butcher.”42  Likewise, a 
law school that competently instructed its students in the law 
and legal analysis would be superior to a thoroughly Catholic 
institution that failed in these essential tasks. 
As set forth in the manuscript, American legal practice and 
legal education is the sort of thing that contains a lot of given-
ness—like other professions and trades, such as accounting and 
plumbing—so that all competent American law schools will teach 
the same core subjects, skills, and virtues.  Every law school will 
teach the principle of stare decisis, explain the rule of negligence 
in torts, and guide students through basic aspects of legal 
practice like filing a motion.  Nothing can displace a solid 
grounding in the technical knowledge of law and the acquisition 
of skills necessary for the competent practice of law that all law 
schools must provide to their students. 
Dean Rougeau accurately summarizes our claim, that 
“Catholic law schools in the United States are not distinctive in a 
way that is an obvious expression of their Catholic identity, [such 
that] these institutions have failed as Catholic law schools.”43  As 
Professor Rick Garnett correctly notes, we believe that “if there is 
any value to distinctiveness, it must be rooted in, and reflect, an 
‘intellectual architecture’ ” and that “the foundation and 
cornerstone of that architecture needs to be a distinctively 
Christian moral ‘anthropology.’ ”44  Every law school should, as 
Garnett says, educate its students in the language of law, in legal 
doctrine and the tools of legal analysis, and in the policies and 
normative claims behind law.45  These are features that all law 
schools share in common.  But a Catholic school should go beyond 
this and help students see the connections between law and “the 
nature and destiny of the human person.”46  This feature can 
accommodate a variety of law school models while ensuring a 
distinctive identity that enriches the diversity of the legal 
academy.47 
 
42 This quote has been attributed to Martin Luther but may be apocryphal.   
43 Rougeau, supra note 4, at 90. 
44 Garnett, supra note 5, at 69–70. 
45 Id. at 71–72. 
46 Id. at 73. 
47 See John H. Garvey, Introduction, AALS Symposium on Institutional 
Pluralism: The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125, 
130 (2009). 
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B. The Claim That Catholic Law Schools Are Already Fulfilling 
Their Mission: The Abstract Mission Fallacy and Focal Case 
Analysis 
Perhaps not surprisingly, several of the commentators 
characterize their law schools as already fulfilling a genuinely 
Catholic mission.  For example, Dean Boozang states that at 
Seton Hall they hope to “produce lawyers who subscribe to the 
Catholic intellectual tradition.”48  She believes that “[m]uch of 
what we do at Seton Hall Law School does resemble the vision 
articulated by Professors Breen and Strang.”49  She then points to 
a part of Seton Hall’s orientation for first-year students in which 
her colleagues introduce students to different conceptions of 
justice by reading Michael Sandel’s book, Justice.50  As proof that 
an appreciation of justice has taken hold, she then proudly notes 
that “[m]ost students conclude their tenure with us by 
participating in a clinic in our Center for Social Justice.”51 
Similarly, as noted above, Dean Treanor believes that 
Catholic law schools are distinctive when they make explicit 
their commitment to justice, something he suggests is not true of 
other law schools.52  At Georgetown a commitment to justice is 
“simply a given.”53  He notes that the school offers “various paths 
for spiritual exercises” and “shorter courses in Jesuit 
spirituality.”54  Georgetown is fulfilling its mission because it 
welcomes “the active contributions of Jesuits and other clergy in 
our law school’s Campus Ministry office” and because it offers 
“several courses” that relate to religious faith and the law.55  
Treanor believes that these features at Georgetown show that 
“[the school’s] Jesuit and Catholic identities very much define[s] 
it.”56 
It would be uncharacteristic of a dean not to expound upon 
the virtues of his or her law school, but these remarks reflect 
more than institutional loyalty.  They strike a defensive posture 
which, notwithstanding the compliments paid to the book, 
 
48 Boozang, supra note 7, at 7.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. (citing MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 
(2009)). 
51 Id. 
52 Treanor, supra note 3, at 101. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 103. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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indicate a fundamental disagreement with our view that most 
Catholic law schools are not fulfilling their mission as Catholic 
institutions of higher learning.  We argue that most law schools 
operating under Catholic sponsorship fail to introduce their 
students to the Catholic intellectual tradition with respect to 
questions of law and justice.  By contrast, Deans Boozang and 
Treanor believe Catholic legal education as currently practiced is 
mission focused and on track.  Although the St. John’s 
symposium did not provide this backdrop, in delivering this 
assessment it was easy to imagine a large banner unfurled 
behind the deans declaring “Mission Accomplished!” 
The discrete features that the deans highlight in their 
respective law schools are certainly positive aspects of the legal 
education they provide.  Even when taken together, however, it is 
difficult to see how they represent the fulfillment of Catholic 
mission.  Seton Hall is certainly doing its students a great service 
by introducing them to different understandings of justice early 
in their law school careers, but a brief introduction to natural law 
and virtue ethics alongside libertarianism, utilitarianism, and 
Rawlsian justice-as-fairness during their first-year orientation 
can hardly ensure that the study of law at Seton Hall introduces 
students to and forms them in the Catholic intellectual tradition.  
Michael Sandel is an important philosopher, but to have students 
read his book and think they have received an adequate 
introduction to a Catholic moral anthropology is misleading. 
Similarly, Dean Treanor is right to applaud the active 
campus ministry at Georgetown University Law Center.  Every 
Catholic law school should provide students with the opportunity 
for spiritual growth, and many non-Catholic law schools are 
fortunate to have active Newman Centers attending to the 
spiritual needs of their Catholic students.57  But the immediate 
purpose of a law school, or any academic unit within a university, 
is not devotional or liturgical, but intellectual.  Providing 
members of the law school community with opportunities to 
explore St. Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises and other dimensions of 
Jesuit spirituality is laudable, but these are no substitute for 
 
57 See, e.g., HARV. CATHOLIC CENTER, https://www.harvardcatholic.org 
[https://perma.cc/MZ8R-UU8A] (last visited June 30, 2021). Surely, Dean Treanor 
must know that the fact that there are secular and non-Catholic law schools, like 
Harvard, where the liturgical and other spiritual needs of Catholic students are met 
demonstrates that provision of these same things at a Catholic law school is 
insufficient to demonstrate the fulfillment of Catholic identity. 
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presenting students with the opportunity to study American law 
through the lens of the Catholic intellectual tradition and its 
moral anthropology.  Moreover, a handful of discrete, elective 
courses in Catholic social teaching, and religion and a lawyer’s 
work,58 however well intentioned, cannot accomplish this goal for 
more than a handful of students.  Most American law schools 
expose their students to a variety of perspectives in the courses 
they offer, including religious perspectives.  Harvard Law School, 
for instance, has offered Law and Catholic Thought: Liberalism 
and Integralism, a course that addresses “[t]he social teaching of 
the Catholic Church—its teaching on political, economic, and 
legal justice, human dignity and rights, and the requirements of 
the common good,”59 but it would be silly to suggest that Harvard 
is fulfilling a Catholic mission in legal education.  
1. The Abstract Mission Fallacy 
One reason why a number of commentators are able, in good 
faith, to see and portray their law schools as successfully living 
an authentic Catholic mission is because they employ what we 
call the “abstract mission fallacy.”  This occurs when the 
commentator shifts from one description of a phenomenon to a 
broader, more general, and abstract description of that 
phenomenon.  It is an argumentative move that is ubiquitous in 
the debates over constitutional interpretation, where scholars 
and judges claim that the meaning of a particular constitutional 
text is abstract and then leverage that abstract meaning to reach 
a result that a more specific meaning would not have allowed.60  
For instance, Justice Ginsburg described the Commerce Clause 
as the source of congressional “authority to enact economic 
legislation ‘in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, 
and also in those Cases to which the States are separately 
incompetent.’ ”61  This power “to solve national problems”62 was 
 
58 Treanor, supra note 3, at 103. 
59 Course Catalog: Law and Catholic Thought: Liberalism and Integralism, 
HARV. L. SCH. (2018), https://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/ 
default.aspx?o=73633 [https://perma.cc/W3PH-UAD9]. 
60 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning 
Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 741–57 (describing this phenomenon). 
61 The Healthcare Cases, 567 U.S. 519, 600 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part). 
62 Id. at 601–02. 
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an abstraction from the Clause’s more specific original 
meaning.63   
Dean Rougeau makes this move when he progressively 
recharacterizes as more and more abstract the concrete purposes 
of early Catholic legal education.  He accurately describes 
Catholic law schools as being created “to support the needs and 
aspirations of the marginalized immigrant Catholic newcomers 
to American society.”64  He later recasts this purpose more 
abstractly as “educating marginalized members of society, 
offering them a means to seek a more fully human existence in a 
new country,”65 and then, more broadly still, as a mission that 
“has always been oriented toward social justice.”66   
Dean Boozang makes a similar move.  She states that 
“[m]uch of what we do at Seton Hall Law School does resemble 
the vision articulated by Professors Breen and Strang.”67  She 
then explains that Seton Hall’s first year orientation is “built 
around a theme of justice,” an abstraction from the tradition’s 
own conception of justice.68  The students read Michael Sandel’s 
Justice and “begin playing with alternative jurisprudential 
theories to determine which outcomes satisfy the prerequisites of 
justice.”69 
Professor Carmella likewise moves from agreeing with our 
thesis that the purpose of a Catholic law school requires an 
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition, to the 
“scholarly exploration of the relationship of law to the Catholic 
intellectual tradition,” and finally to “books and articles 
attempting to understand and critique law from religious 
perspectives.”70   
This move often occurs in the literature on Catholic legal 
education.  For instance, in his well-researched book, Fordham 
University School of Law: A History, Robert Kaczorowski states 
and then restates Fordham’s mission in abstracted form.71  Thus, 
early on in his account of Fordham, Kaczorowski describes the 
 
63 See id. at 659 (Joint Dissent) (making this point). 
64 Rougeau, supra note 4, at 91. 
65 Id. at 92. 
66 Id. 
67 Boozang, supra note 7, at 7. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Carmella, supra note 8, at 16−17. 
71 ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: A HISTORY 
5, 14 (2012). 
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Law School as having a specifically Catholic mission that was 
reflected in the teaching of Jurisprudence grounded in Thomistic 
natural law theory.72  Even up until the early 1960s, Kaczorowski 
says Fordham saw its mission as teaching law “against a 
Catholic background.”73  By the end of his narrative, however, 
Fordham has no specific intellectual mission.  Now, Fordham’s 
“distinctive characteristic” is described as being a community 
with a “commitment to excellence.”74  The Law School fulfills this 
abstracted mission by reflecting “the Jesuit tradition of 
commitment to service and education.”75 
There are three important problems with this move.  First, 
the abstract mission fallacy permits scholars to make an 
unwarranted connection between the abstracted mission, which 
is Catholic, and a particular school’s mission, and conclude that 
the latter is a fulfillment of the former.  For instance, social 
justice is an aspect of the Catholic Church’s earthly mission, and 
therefore law schools who have been and are pursuing it are 
Catholic.  Because the concept lacks rigor, however, the result of 
the move to abstraction is invariably to approve a school’s 
claimed Catholic identity.  If a metric cannot identify any non-
Catholic law schools, then it cannot serve as a means for judging 
the fulfillment of Catholic mission in legal education.  Returning 
to Dean Rougeau’s claim, he abstracts from the distinct 
socioeconomic motivations for the founding of Catholic law 
schools to a broader social justice mission, one that is shared by 
most or perhaps all American law schools today.  Since all or 
nearly all American law schools claim that part of their mission 
is social justice, this leads to the absurd conclusion that all or 
nearly all law schools are authentically Catholic, even if they do 
not overtly claim that identity.   
Second, the abstract mission fallacy fails to fit the historical 
actors’ self-understanding.  The founders and leaders of early 
Catholic law schools primarily saw themselves as providing 
opportunities for socioeconomic advancement for recent Catholic 
immigrants and their children.  This motivation properly falls 
under the general heading of what we today would call social 
justice, but if one uses that label without qualification or 
specification, then one’s historical description will be thin and 
 
72 Id. at 4–5, 15–19.  
73 Id. at 150, 143–52. 
74 Id. at 335. 
75 Id. at 345. 
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less accurate because it will not meaningfully correspond to the 
actual historical actors’ own views and beliefs.   
Third, the abstract mission fallacy enables scholars to 
obscure—or perhaps blinds them to—changes to and the severe 
thinning-out of Catholic identity because the law schools that 
now possess this thinner mission are still “Catholic” when the 
mission is stated abstractly.  A law school retains its Catholic 
identity pursuing “social justice” even though its mission has 
materially changed from assimilating Catholic immigrants to 
“evaluating and potentially dismantling the structures of our 
society and economy that enrich the few . . . and move to create 
new ones that dignify and uplift the lives of the many who are 
weak and marginalized” today.76 
2. What It Means to Be a Catholic Law School: Focal Case 
Analysis 
Although we reject our commentators’ defense of the status 
quo, we do not deny that Dean Boozang’s Seton Hall, and Dean 
Treanor’s Georgetown, and other Catholic law schools operate 
with some real sense of Catholic mission.  Their efforts, however, 
fail to satisfy the focal case of what a Catholic law school is.   
The focal case of something is the best, most healthy, and 
flourishing instance of the kind of thing that it is.77  A particular 
specimen can be a more or less healthy or a more or less 
developed example of a given type of organism.  The focal case of 
an oak tree is a tall tree with a thick trunk, large canopy, 
abundant foliage, and many large acorns.  But an oak tree may 
have dead branches, thin foliage, and few acorns and still be an 
oak tree. 
This focal case analysis also applies to human institutions.  
For example, natural law theorists employ it as a way of 
responding to the claims of legal positivists with respect to the 
status of unjust laws.  Legal positivists like H.L.A. Hart hold 
that an ostensible law is law if it enjoys the pedigree identified by 
the authoritative rule of recognition for lawmaking within a 
given legal system.78  Lon Fuller added to this that, to be law, a 
given ordinance must possess certain Rule of Law qualities, 
including, for example, rationality, coherence, intelligibility, 
 
76 Rougeau, supra note 4, at 92, 95. 
77 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9–11 (2d ed. 2011) 
(describing focal case analysis). 
78 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 265 (3d ed. 2012). 
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accessibility, prospectivity.79  In addition to these qualities, 
natural law theorists add that to satisfy the focal case of law, an 
ostensible law must also possess additional characteristics 
regarding the law’s substance, including that the law must 
rationally advance the common good.80  A law that is a focal case 
of law is one that satisfies all of these conditions. 
Not every law shares in all of these characteristics.  As Mark 
Murphy explains, “the best way to understand the natural law 
alternative to legal positivism is not as an alternative account of 
legality, but as a more fully developed account of the idea of 
nondefective legality.”81  Thus, a statute that is lawfully issued by 
a legislature, one that is both substantively just and meets the 
requirements of the Rule of Law, falls within law’s focal case.  By 
contrast, a statute passed by a legislature that satisfies the Rule 
of Law but which discriminates against citizens in the 
distribution of public benefits on the basis of race does not 
advance the common good and so does not come within the focal 
case of law.  Such a statute is “law.”  It satisfies the rule of 
recognition.  It is coherent, intelligible, and prospective.  But 
because the law is unjust, it remains a defective form of legality. 
If and when a Catholic law school reaches the fullest 
actualization of its potential—if it satisfies the focal case of 
Catholic legal education—it will be distinctive.  Catholic legal 
education’s focal case is excellent Catholic legal education.  A 
Catholic law school at its best employs the Catholic intellectual 
tradition to research and write about legal questions, to teach 
law, and to form attorneys with the requisite knowledge, skills, 
and habits to practice American law at the highest level.  The 
Catholic intellectual tradition is an essential aspect of flourishing 
Catholic legal education because it provides the resources to 
structure and justify its essential core, its intellectual heart.  
From the theoretical and foundational to the practical and 
mundane, the Catholic intellectual tradition has the capacity to 
structure legal education.  From the tradition’s description of the 
human person, who is simultaneously the subject and end of law, 
to the regalia worn by graduates, which can be traced back to the 
cowls worn by monks, the tradition can give Catholic character to 
legal education.  In the manuscript, we described how the 
 
79 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 42–43 (rev. ed. 1969). 
80  See FINNIS, supra note 77, at 27 (describing the focal case of law).   
81 MARK C. MURPHY, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THE FUNDAMENTALS 44 (2007). 
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Catholic intellectual tradition should inform the structure and 
contribute to the excellence of Catholic legal education: 
One would expect that an academic institution (such as a law 
school) that claimed to be founded under a Catholic inspiration 
would be animated by Catholic ideas that informed the 
substance of its operations.  In particular, one would expect that 
the Catholic understanding of the law in general (jurisprudence) 
and in a particular jurisdiction (the positive law) as well as the 
ultimate subject of law (the human person) and the end of law 
(justice) would inform a Catholic law school in the curriculum it 
offered, the teaching methods it employed, the questions it 
posed, and the scholarly answers it[] proposed.82   
A Catholic law school that provided “access and commitment to 
justice,”83 one that educated and assimilated immigrants and 
outsiders84 and advanced “social justice,”85 one that was “an 
authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ”86 
would fall short of its potential because in addition to these 
worthy activities, it can and should also employ the tradition in 
its scholarship, teaching, and formation.  The Catholic 
intellectual tradition must reside in its intellectual essence. 
The position we advance in the manuscript does not preclude 
the possibility—indeed, we see it as a likelihood—that actual, on-
the-ground Catholic law schools will not fully actualize their 
potential.  They will not satisfy the focal case of what it means to 
be a Catholic law school.  It is likely that most Catholic law 
schools will lack some of the characteristics of a fully actualized 
Catholic law school.  Some Catholic law school faculties will 
teach their class subjects without utilizing the tradition to 
justify, elucidate, and criticize the doctrines they teach.  
Similarly, some Catholic law schools may teach their graduates 
to treat legal practice as solely about earning a living, obtaining 
social standing, or access to power, and not as a personal 
vocation to provide justice to persons in need.  Likewise, some 
Catholic law school clinics will teach the procedure and skills of 
American legal practice, without emphasis on the virtues lawyers 
 
82 Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 8. 
83 Treanor, supra note 3, at 100. 
84 Rougeau, supra note 4, at 91. 
85 Id. at 92. 
86 Vischer, supra note 3, at 119 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC 
CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE ¶ 21 (1990)). To be clear, Dean Vischer does 
not exclude other aspects of the tradition, especially its “intellectual dimension”; he 
claims that the mission is broader than an intellectual framework. Id. 
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need to possess: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and especially 
justice.  In other words, these Catholic law schools may carry the 
banner “Catholic” but will be indistinguishable from non-Catholic 
law schools regarding these facets of their programs.  These 
schools may rightly be regarded as Catholic, but they are 
deficient in the realization of their Catholic identity. 
The prescription set forth in the manuscript has the capacity 
to identify Catholic law schools that, to a greater or lesser degree, 
fulfill their potential.  This capacity to identify gradations is 
itself a virtue that reflects the lived reality of how human beings 
and human institutions actualize themselves.  Individual human 
beings characteristically fail to live up to their potential in many 
ways.87  We tell “white lies,” we eat one piece of chocolate too 
many, and we fail to appreciate our family members.  Human 
institutions, too, fail to achieve their potential with regularity.  
Scientific panels of experts may be influenced by considerations 
outside their technical field of competence.88  The focal case 
analysis offered here identifies what makes a law school 
authentically Catholic.  Moreover, because it can explain why 
and in what ways law schools regularly fail to fully utilize the 
Catholic intellectual tradition, it allows us to acknowledge the 
Catholic identity of Catholic law schools today while pointing to 
the ultimately inadequate expression of that identity. 
In sum, Catholic legal education must be distinctive in order 
for it to merit the label Catholic.  It must possess distinct 
qualities to achieve its distinctive goals, even if many of these 
qualities overlap with those of non-Catholic law schools.  We 
argue that a Catholic law school whose purpose and means are 
 
87 Indeed, Christianity’s explanation for this typical human failing—original 
sin—gives Christianity significant explanatory power. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra 
note 30, at 154–58 (explaining St. Augustine’s conception of human will and its 
relatively greater explanatory power over Aristotle’s).   
88 See, e.g., Mallory Simon, Over 1000 Health Professionals Sign a Letter Saying, 
Don’t Shut Down Protests Using Coronavirus Concerns as an Excuse, CNN (June 5, 
2020, 9:08 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/health/health-care-open-letter-
protests-coronavirus-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/H49C-DDFV] (summarizing a 
letter sign by public health experts who had previously claimed that gathering in 
crowds for work, or recreation, or worship posed an unacceptable risk for spreading 
the Coronavirus but then claimed that gathering in crowds to protest racism does 
not because racism is an important public health issue). This is not a new 
phenomenon. For example, American atomic scientists leveraged their expertise in 
public policy debates at the dawn of the atomic age to make claims beyond their 
expertise. S. Waqar H. Zaidi, Scientists as Political Experts: Atomic Scientists and 
their Claims for Expertise on International Relations, 1945-1947, 63 CENTAURUS 17 
(2021). 
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taken from the Catholic intellectual tradition would merit such a 
label. 
By contrast, the commentators’ contention—that a Catholic 
law school that is identical to a non-Catholic law school may still 
be regarded as authentically Catholic—is only partially accurate.  
Such a law school could indeed be Catholic, but it would be an 
immature, stunted, warped, or even diseased version of Catholic 
legal education.  Such a Catholic law school may indeed provide 
access to legal education for immigrants and other disadvantaged 
groups, or it may in fact inculcate the pursuit of justice and 
public service in its graduates.  These would indeed be marks of a 
Catholic mission even though they are shared with most non-
Catholic law schools.89  However, if these are the sole or primary 
ways in which a Catholic law school advances its mission—if its 
faculty members do not teach their subjects and engage in their 
scholarship with the Catholic intellectual tradition in mind, and 
if its students do not learn how to live their vocations well—then 
that law school has failed to achieve its potential.90 
Dean Vischer accurately states that a Catholic law school 
should be “an authentic human community animated by the 
spirit of Christ.”91  This is clearly an identity to which every 
Catholic law school should conform and one moreover that cannot 
animate secular law schools.  Even this Catholic mission, 
however, is inadequate to serve as a justification for Catholic 
legal education without significant elaboration as to the 
substance of its academic course of study and intellectual life.  
Many communities and organizations profess to be animated by 
Christ’s Spirit—soup kitchens, credit unions, scouting troops, 
and medical schools—but only those communities whose 
fundamental intellectual activities are legal scholarship, law 
teaching, and student formation, and that are performed drawing 
on the riches of the Catholic intellectual tradition, can claim to be 
a Catholic law school in the focal case, animated by the Spirit of 
Christ. 
 
89 See Garnett, supra note 5, at 69 (agreeing with this point). 
90 It is because a fully flourishing Catholic law school’s intellectual activities are 
enhanced by the Catholic intellectual tradition that Professor Garnett argued that 
the “Catholic law school project” would be or is a new phenomenon, one not 
previously accomplished. Id. at 65–66. 
91 Vischer, supra note 3, at 119. To be clear, Dean Vischer does not exclude other 
aspects of the tradition, especially its “intellectual dimension”; he claims that the 
mission is broader than an intellectual framework. Id. 
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Examining the Deans’ factual claims through the lens  of our 
focal case analysis suggests that they provide little evidence that 
Catholic law schools currently have a Catholic mission.  We 
noted earlier that Dean Treanor’s evidence that Fordham and 
Georgetown are authentically Catholic is that the “Catholic law 
schools where I have taught are explicit in their commitment to 
justice.”92  As should be clear now, an explicit commitment to 
justice is not, by itself, sufficient evidence that the Catholic law 
school is flourishing.  A commitment to justice is an aspect of a 
full Catholic law school, but if the law school lacks engagement 
with the Catholic intellectual tradition in its scholarship, 
teaching, and mentorship, it has yet to fully actualize its 
potential.   
Dean Treanor also focuses on Catholic law schools’ clinical 
programs as evidence of those schools’ Catholic missions.  He 
claims that both Fordham’s and Georgetown’s clinical programs 
reflect not only “a pedagogic commitment” but are evidence of 
each school’s commitment to equip graduates “to work to make 
this a more just world,”93 a sentiment he hears affirmed by his 
“fellow Catholic law school deans.”94  This, he says, is evidence of 
mission that “may not show up in the formal accreditation 
documents submitted to the ABA” but is nonetheless real.95 
This is pretty thin stuff.  Georgetown’s own public materials 
about its clinics fail to reference either their Catholic inspiration 
or mission to “make this a more just world.”96  More importantly, 
our claim is not that there was no evidence of Catholic mission of 
clinics in “formal accreditation documents,” though that is true.97  
As set forth in the manuscript, our archival research has 
uncovered little evidence anywhere that Catholic law schools 
created clinics to fulfill their Catholic mission.  The evidence we 
have found in the historical record is that Catholic law schools 
 
92 Treanor, supra note 3, at 101. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Clinics, GEO. L., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/experiential-learning/ 
clinics/ [https://perma.cc/3BTR-VHK4] (last visited June 30, 2021). Fordham comes 
closer because it tells the public that its clinics teach students “to solve real 
problems for individuals, and for our society.” Choosing A Clinic , FORDHAM 
UNIV. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23690/choosing_a_clinic 
[https://perma.cc/3UFB-BBX9] (last visited June 30, 2021).  
97 With one potential exception: Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. 
Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 478. 
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created clinics, like their secular peers, to help their students 
acquire skills and prepare for the world of legal practice.98 
We agree that, within any institution, there are ideas and 
commitments that go unnoticed by the outside observer.  Even 
though they are not spelled out in a mission statement or policy 
manual, these ideas and commitments may be part of the culture 
of the place that deeply inform its day-to-day operations.  Still, in 
the absence of any explicit reference to Catholic mission with 
respect to a law school’s clinical programs, it is too easy for a 
dean to simply declare that every aspect of the school is infused 
with a sense of mission: “It’s there!  You just can’t see it.  Our 
Catholic mission may not be visible to the untrained eye, but it’s 
pervasive.  It’s in the very air we breathe.”  But sweeping 
assertions like these must give way when specific questions are 
posed.  For example, how does Georgetown’s Women’s Law & 
Public Policy Fellowship Program,99 which serves as a pipeline to 
organizations working to advance abortion rights both at home 
and abroad,100 draw inspiration from Georgetown’s Catholic 
mission? 
A number of commentators claim that the founding mission 
of Catholic law schools was the pursuit of social justice, and that 
today they continue to carry out that mission, though with 
varying degree of success.  Dean Rougeau, for instance, 
characterizes the early mission of Catholic law schools as 
“educ[ating] and assimilat[ing] mostly poor, often illiterate, 
immigrant outsiders . . . .”101  This mission is a clearly Catholic 
mission because it “is deeply consistent with priorities Jesus 
announces in the Gospels,”102 one of “social justice.”103  Dean 
Treanor states that Fordham and Georgetown are authentically 
 
98 See, e.g., Experiential Education, FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. L., 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/23615/experiential_education [https://perma.cc/4CZQ-
CUVQ] (last visited June 30, 2021). “In recognition of the importance of clinical and 
experiential education in preparing students for the practice of law, Fordham Law 
School guarantees to every” student a clinical opportunity. Id. 
99 See generally Women’s Law & Public Policy Fellowship Program, GEO. UNIV. 
L. CTR., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wlppfp/ [https://perma.cc/52J7-9YF4 ] (last 
visited June 30, 2021). 
100 This is evident not only from the externships into which the Program places 
students, but in the work graduating fellows pursue after leaving Georgetown. See, 
e.g., Alumnae Spotlight, OUTREACH (Women’s L. & Pub. Pol’y Fellowship Program at 
Georgetown Law, Washington, D.C.), Spring/Summer 2020, at 5. 
101 Rougeau, supra note 4, at 91. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 92. 
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Catholic because they “are explicit in their commitment to 
justice.”104 
Our focal case analysis suggests that a law school’s 
intellectual activities have to be enriched by the resources of the 
Catholic intellectual tradition in order for the school to be fully 
Catholic.  A law school that in fact pursued social justice would 
be doing a very good thing.  But that alone would not make it an 
authentically Catholic law school.  Instead, at best, it would be a 
partially Catholic law school because its essential aspects lacked 
engagement with the tradition—an oak tree with thin foliage and 
few acorns.   
Professor Angela Carmella takes up our claim that the 
Catholic identity of a law school must have an intellectual 
dimension.  She identifies several important scholarly works over 
the past twenty-five years as evidence of scholarly engagement 
with the Catholic intellectual tradition,105 including a book that 
she edited and to which she contributed.106  Professor Carmella 
concludes that “many professors at Catholic law schools (and 
Catholic law professors at non-Catholic schools) have been 
building a body of scholarship on Catholic perspectives on 
various fields of law and jurisprudential schools of thought.”107  
She suggests that this robust body of work “should serve to 
temper the conclusion that ‘[t]here is next to nothing about their 
faculty and faculty scholarship . . . that set them apart from the 
mine-run of American law schools.’ ”108 
These are fair points, and we do not wish to diminish the 
real and good work being done currently with the Catholic 
intellectual tradition,109 but we believe Professor Carmella 
overstates the significance and distinctiveness of Catholic law 
faculty and their scholarship.  First, Professor Carmella’s 
argument, like the arguments of other commentators, moves 
from the particular—“scholarly exploration of the relationship of 
law to the Catholic intellectual tradition”—to the abstract—
 
104 Treanor, supra note 3, at 101. 
105 Carmella, supra note 8, at 16–18. 
106 Id. at 17. Similar books include RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: 
CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LAW (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa S. 
Collett eds., 2012), and AMERICAN LAW FROM A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE: THROUGH A 
CLEARER LENS (Ronald J. Rychlak ed. 2015). 
107 Carmella, supra note 8, at 16. 
108 Id. at 17–18. 
109 Indeed, both of us see our scholarship as (hopefully!) contributing to this body 
of work. 
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“books and articles attempting to understand and critique law 
from religious perspectives.”110  The former is a much smaller 
category than the latter, and the former is what is necessary for 
the full flourishing of a Catholic law school’s mission. 
Second, the examples given by Professor Carmella as 
evidence of Catholic law school engagement with the Catholic 
intellectual tradition are evidence of such engagement, but only 
thin evidence.  Professor Carmella describes these faculty as 
“engage[d] in religion and law teaching, or scholarship, or 
both.”111  This label already shows that the scholars are not 
necessarily engaged with the Catholic intellectual tradition.  
Moreover, numerous scholars at law schools across the country 
are “engage[d] in religion and law,”112 which is understood to 
refer to the study of religious liberty and church-state 
relationships.  Many non-Catholic law schools have centers and 
institutes devoted to this field.113  Two of the scholars described 
by Professor Carmella are engaged in studying “Evangelical 
Protestant Thought” and “Islam,” which may include engagement 
with the Catholic intellectual tradition, but if so, it is not obvious; 
Out of fifty-three current, full-time faculty at Seton Hall, 
Professor Carmella identifies only four who appear to be engaged 
in the Catholic intellectual tradition in their scholarship.114  That 
is approximately seven percent of the faculty.  Seton Hall’s Dean, 
Kathleen Boozang, endorses the idea of a “critical mass” of 
faculty who take up the intellectual mission of a Catholic law 
school,115 but seven percent is nowhere close to a critical mass, 
much less a majority of the faculty.  Professor Carmella also 
points to two emeritus faculty who are engaged with the Catholic 
 
110 Carmella, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
111 Id. at 17 n.8. 
112 Id.; Seton Hall University 2019 Standard 509 Information Report, ABA SEC.  
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org 
/Disclosure509.aspx [https://perma.cc/LS2F-C3FJ]. 
113 Professor Carmella lists examples of Catholic law schools engaged in law and 
religion scholarship and teaching, and those centers do good work, but such work is 
certainly not the prerogative of Catholic law schools, nor is it necessarily evidence of 
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition. Emory’s Center for the Study of 
Law and Religion, BYU’s International Center for the Study of Law and Religion, 
Standford’s Religious Liberty Clinic, and the University of Texas’ recent Law and 
Religion Clinic are prominent examples of a widespread law-and-religion 
phenomenon. 
114 Professor Carmella lists Dean Boozang and Professors Ambrosio and 
Franzese. Carmella, supra note 8, at 17 n.8. 
115 Boozang, supra note 7, at 8. 
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intellectual tradition and one who is engaged in Islam.116  While 
emeritus faculty in many instances contribute greatly to a 
faculty, their scholarly engagement typically diminishes over 
time, and they no longer participate in the governance of the law 
school.  In sum, it may well be true that Seton Hall has 
“consistently encouraged” Carmella and her colleagues to pursue 
their Catholic and other religious interests in the law,117 but the 
data she cites hardly proves that Seton Hall has an institutional 
commitment to engagement with the Catholic intellectual 
tradition in its intellectual heart of scholarship, teaching, and 
student mentorship. 
Professor Amy Uelmen identifies what she says is “the most 
urgent task for Catholic law schools” today, namely “to help 
students reflect on the question of how to make the connection 
between the difficult cultural, social, and institutional questions 
that they will face as attorneys, in the light of critical reflection 
on their own deep values systems.”118  It appears that Professor 
Uelmen believes that the mission of Catholic legal education is 
“to facilitate reflection on the actual connections that students 
make with their own values—and with problems in the world”119 
because this is what law students need to prepare them for legal 
practice.120  According to Uelmen, “[t]he distinctive purpose, the 
point of Catholic legal education, should be framed in terms of 
the problems that future lawyers will encounter in the world.”121  
This focus is driven by a theology of the laity’s role in the secular 
world.122  Uelmen says she agrees that natural law, Catholic 
social thought, and various aspects of the intellectual tradition 
“are all valuable bodies of work for raising critical questions 
regarding a deep values structure.”123  She insists that she does 
not seek to “discard the robust resources of the Tradition” but 
wants to “place much greater emphasis on the methods for 
helping students to engage these questions.”124   
 
116 Carmella, supra note 8, at 17 n.8 (Professors McCauliff, Coverdale, and 
Freamon.). 
117 Carmella, supra note 8, at 17 n.8. 
118 Amelia J. Uelmen, The Distinctive Questions of Catholics in History, 58 J. 
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 105, 110 (2019). 
119 Id. at 112. 
120 Id. at 111–12. 
121 Id. 
122 See id. at 112 (“[T]he theological education of lay people should be shaped by 
their distinct roles and tasks in the world.”) (citation omitted). 
123 Id. at 110. 
124 Id. at 112. 
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We believe that Professor Uelmen’s prescription for Catholic 
legal education could be consistent with our proposal, or it may 
fall seriously short of what we prescribe.  There is nothing in our 
proposal that precludes connecting students with resources from 
the tradition so they may best navigate their professional lives.  
Nor did we counsel avoiding the existential questions students 
will have about themselves and their vocations.  Indeed, we 
argued that authentic Catholic legal education will work hard to 
equip students with the knowledge, skills, and habits they need 
to thrive in professional settings to live out their vocation.  On 
this compatibilist reading, Professor Uelmen provides useful 
concrete guidance about how Catholic law schools can do so.   
We also think it is possible to read Professor Uelmen’s essay 
as incompatible with our prescription, as downplaying and 
maybe eliminating Catholic legal education’s “overarching 
conceptual system” in favor of “methods” to help students 
address the deep questions of law, justice, and vocation.125  The 
Catholic intellectual tradition has given rise to a host of methods 
in a variety of disciplines, but the tradition “is not merely 
methodological or procedural but substantive in nature.”126  It is 
one thing for Uelmen to recommend that we need to move 
“beyond podium-style explanations of intellectual categories and 
content”127 as ineffective given the current generation of law 
students.  It is quite another thing to suggest that a Catholic law 
school can fulfill its mission in a solely methodological fashion 
without regard to the intellectual content it shares with students.  
If that is Professor Uelmen’s meaning, then her suggestion is not 
compatible with our thesis.  Catholic legal education is the sort of 
thing that is best when it is distinctive in its many dimensions, 
not only in its preparation of students, but also in its intellectual 
life, in the scholarship and teaching of its faculty.  Professor 
Uelmen’s account is too narrow because it focuses on student 
experiences, but says very little about faculty and their 
scholarship and teaching. 
To see how this interpretation of Professor Uelmen’s account 
would fall short of authentic Catholic legal education, imagine a 
 
125 Id. at 110, 112. 
126 John M. Breen, Action as the Fruit of Contemplation: A Reply to Bryce, 
Donnelly, Kalscheur, and Nussbaum, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 645, 665 (2007/2008) 
(critiquing Rev. Gregory Kalscheur, S.J.’s defense of Jesuit education as a method or 
“way of proceeding”). 
127 Uelmen, supra note 118, at 112. 
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Catholic law school that sought to reach its students “where they 
are, just as they are” and to “help[ ] them integrate their personal 
and religious values into their professional identity.”128  Imagine 
further that the school is populated with students who oppose 
religious liberty, as well as faculty who support this point of view 
and publish scholarly articles arguing that religious liberty and 
conscience exceptions are used as a tool of discrimination and a 
cudgel to limit the freedom of non-believers.  It appears that if 
such a Catholic law school with such a faculty were to help such 
law students more fully understand why religious liberty is 
wrong and encourage such students to connect their beliefs with 
their future practice—taking clients who argued against religious 
liberty—then this would seem to be in keeping with the idea of 
Catholic identity understood simply as a method.  That is, such a 
school would seem to “help students reflect on the question of 
how to make the connection between the difficult cultural, social, 
and institutional questions that they will face as attorneys, in the 
light of critical reflection on their own deep values systems.”129  If 
this reading of Uelmen’s proposal of Catholic identity is correct—
wherein methodology overshadows content—then our vision of 
Catholic legal education would be inconsistent with it, as 
Uelmen’s proposal would fail to describe Catholic legal education 
in its focal case.   
C. Big Tent Catholicism and the Fear That Authentic Catholic 
Identity Will Threaten Academic Freedom 
Several commentators believe that the vision for Catholic 
legal education that we set forth in the manuscript is overly 
narrow.  There are, says Dean Treanor, “diverse models and 
paths”130 that Catholic legal education can take.  According to 
Dean Rougeau, the way in which we “seek to define a law school 
as Catholic is one way, but it is not the only way.”131  Moreover, 
modern university life is defined by academic freedom.  Professor 
Carmella reminds us that “the Church itself is internally divided 
in many ways”132 and that Catholic law schools must embrace the 
diversity of views within the Church.  In other words, Catholic 
legal education must accommodate “big tent Catholicism.” 
 
128 Id. at 115. 
129 Id. at 110. 
130 Treanor, supra note 3, at 104. 
131 Rougeau, supra note 4, at 97. 
132 Carmella, supra note 8, at 21. 
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Professor Carmella fears that our purportedly narrow 
conception of Catholic legal education may not encourage the 
Catholic intellectual tradition “in its fullness and diversity” but 
may instead be employed as a vehicle for the “revival of 
orthodoxy.”133  Carmella rightly praises “the complexity and 
depth of the tradition”—a tradition “pulling in thousands of years 
of classical, biblical, theological, and philosophical reflection.”134  
Moreover, she sees the breadth of the tradition as “critical to the 
success of any curriculum change or program of faculty 
scholarship.”135  “We should,” she says, “welcome discourse with 
any scholars who engage the tradition” including those “who 
explicitly reject elements in the tradition.”136  However, Carmella 
is worried that, because we recognize that there are “central and 
mandatory facets of the tradition,”137 our proposal for the 
integration of the tradition into Catholic law school curricula will 
be “overshadowed by concerns about orthodoxy” and “the specter 
of censorship.”138  Dean Boozang is similarly alarmed by our 
claim that academic freedom at a Catholic law school should 
extend to “areas of ‘reasonable debate and discussion’ ” about the 
Catholic intellectual tradition.139  She says this implies that there 
are positions that fall outside the tradition, yet faculty need 
unfettered freedom to consider the hard questions that may 
arise.140  
We agree with Carmella and Boozang that, with respect to 
academic freedom, the manuscript is underdeveloped, and we 
 
133 Id. at 16. We do indeed refer to a “revival of orthodoxy” in the manuscript, 
but we do so in the context of referring to the Church’s turning away from the worst 
of the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council in terms of theology, catechesis, and 
liturgy. The Church’s struggles in the wake of the council are well documented. 
Andrew Brown, How the Second Vatican Council Responded to the Modern World, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 201), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/andrewbrown/2012/oct/11/second-vatical-council-50-years-catholicism 
[https://perma.cc/2ZUC-UJUR]. Here we were not specifically referring to Catholic 
legal scholarship, which largely ignores theology. There have, however, been some 
examples of law review articles that incorporated some of the heterodox opinions 
generated following Vatican II. See, e.g., Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be 
Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 297, 372–373 (1997). 
134 Carmella, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 19–20. 
137 Id. at 20. 
138 Id. at 21. 
139 Boozang, supra note 7, at 11. 
140 Id. at 11. 
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appreciate their constructive criticism.  Still, a few points can be 
said by way of response. 
First, we acknowledge that “even for those central and 
mandatory facets of the tradition, Catholic legal scholars may 
reasonably engage with different implications of those facets.”141  
Thus, when Carmella argues that there are tenets of the 
tradition that must be acknowledged (for example, the institution 
of private property and the reality of human agency) she also 
notes that these beliefs can be examined in a variety of ways 
from within the tradition (for instance, the idea that property 
rights are subject to a “social mortgage” and the possibility of 
circumstances that diminish the exercise of human freedom and 
so reduce culpability).142  This is “the complexity and depth of the 
tradition”143 on display to which Carmella refers, and it is 
something that all Catholic law schools should happily welcome. 
Second, an honest assessment of legal academia today would 
recognize that there is no shortage of law professors who reject 
core elements of the Catholic intellectual tradition, including 
such foundational beliefs as the inherent dignity of every human 
being.  As Professor Collett notes in her response, this includes 
faculty members at Catholic law schools across the country.144  
“Engagement” with the tradition can take many forms: from 
whole-hearted endorsement to rote repetition, to harmonious 
extension, to friendly critique, and outright repudiation.  Insofar 
as it is intellectually honest, each of these forms of engagement 
should be welcomed.  But the problem in Catholic legal education 
is not a dearth of faculty who engage with the tradition through 
critique and repudiation.  Just the opposite—the problem is the 
paltry number of faculty who have a competent grasp of the 
tradition and who are willing and able to engage it constructively 
in their scholarship and teaching.  While different forms of 
engagement are welcome, “it cannot be the case that the 
exclusive or even predominant mode of engagement with the 
Catholic intellectual tradition is one of repudiation and 
critique.”145  A Catholic law school that did as much would merely 
 
141 Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 529. 
142 Carmella, supra note 8, at 19. 
143 Id. 
144 Teresa Stanton Collett, Saints, Sinners, and Scoundrels: Catholic Law 
Faculty and A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal Education in the United 
States, 58. J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–36, 39–42 (2019). 
145 John M. Breen, The Air in the Balloon: Further Notes on Catholic and Jesuit 
Identity in Legal Education, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 41, 63 n.68 (2007/08). 
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replicate what is already taking place at non-Catholic and 
secular law schools. 
Third, the commentators are right to note the capacious 
nature of the Catholic intellectual tradition.  The tradition is 
indeed a vast country—full of peaks, valleys, and great plains, 
teeming cities and empty desert—but it is not a country without 
borders.  One can wander outside its wide expanse, even as one 
claims to be in-country.  Big as the tent is, it is possible to step 
outside its flaps.  There are premises, propositions, and 
arguments that lie outside the tradition, and these stake out 
definite positions that are inimical to a genuinely Catholic vision 
of a just society.  Contrary to what Carmella says, nowhere do we 
raise “the specter of censorship.”146  Elsewhere we have suggested 
that Catholic universities may legitimately approach the 
question maintaining both Catholic identity and academic 
freedom in different ways,147 but we have not endorsed any one 
approach. 
If a law school is committed to structuring its activities 
within the Catholic intellectual tradition, there is simply no 
getting around the line-drawing concern raised by Boozang and 
Carmella.  One cannot say that there are no boundaries because, 
in theory and in practice, that is inconsistent with the tradition 
itself.  But, if one recognizes that there are boundaries to the 
tradition, then one must draw lines.  We acknowledge that there 
will be reasonable disagreement about where those lines should 
be drawn, and by whom they should be drawn.  Our proposal 
would locate the locus of decision-making within different bodies 
and persons, depending on the institution.  This solution will 
lead to different on-the-ground interpretations of the tradition.   
Fourth, and relatedly, the word “orthodoxy” draws shudders 
from faculty members at all law schools (including Catholic 
schools) conjuring up images of religious authorities wielding 
political power.  This is understandable as the life of an academic 
is supposed to be a life free of enforced conformity in research, 
publication, and belief.  Still, there are orthodoxies to which most 
members of the legal academy subscribe, opposition to which may 
preclude initial employment, success in publication, and 
professional advancement.  Support for abortion rights is one 
 
146 Carmella, supra note 8, at 21. 
147 John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, Academic Freedom and the Catholic 
University: An Historical Review, a Conceptual Analysis, and a Prescriptive 
Proposal, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 253, 253–55 (2019).  
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such orthodoxy.  Here Professor Carmella’s and Dean Boozang’s 
remarks seem designed to preserve the status quo.  Their 
comments seek to make room on Catholic law school faculties for 
support for abortion and the other positions on matters where 
the Church is a beacon of light in what Pope John Paul II 
referred to as the “culture of death”148 and what Pope Francis has 
termed a “throwaway culture.”149  Thus, Boozang defends her 
scholarship on Catholic hospitals and “women’s access to 
healthcare services”150 wherein she argues that, where a religious 
accommodation is not achievable, “the state should require the 
religious hospital to provide the required health services 
[including contraceptive services and sterilization by Catholic 
hospitals], or condition licensure or certificate of need approval of 
the merged entity on the arrangement of an alternative provider 
of services.”151 
For her part, Carmella correctly notes that the Catholic 
tradition includes the distinction between law and morality and 
maintains that not everything immoral ought to be subject to 
criminal penalty.152  She also declares, without arguing, that laws 
outlawing abortion would not be efficacious. Carmella also cites 
to Greg Kalschur, S.J.’s interpretation of John Courtney Murray, 
S.J., that law must be supported by a “consensus” before being 
brought into effect.153  These claims—the need for “consensus” 
before pro-life measures are adopted, and the supposed lack of 
efficacy enjoyed by those measures—can be answered by drawing 
upon resources within the tradition, as well as other fields of 
human knowledge.154  Again, the fact that these sorts of 
 
148 Paul Galloway, John Paul Condemns ‘Culture of Death’, CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 31, 1995), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1995-03-31-
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149 See, e.g., Josephine McKenna, Pope Francis Urges Europeans to Reject 
‘Throwaway Culture’, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 25, 2014), 
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arguments can take place are a testament to “the complexity and 
depth of the tradition.”155  Nevertheless, some things remain 
irretrievably outside the tradition.  Because abortion is the direct 
killing of an innocent human being156 the positive law “cannot 
declare to be right what would be opposed to the natural 
law . . . .”157   
While public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop 
to something which—were it prohibited—would cause more 
serious harm, it can never presume to legitimize as a right of 
individuals . . . an offence against other persons caused by the 
disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life.158   
Yet the right to kill an unborn child through abortion is either 
the premise or the conclusion in the abortion scholarship by law 
professors at Catholic and non-Catholic law schools alike.  A law 
school that seeks to hire faculty who write in favor of abortion, 
who seek to advance a throwaway culture, does not live an 
authentic Catholic mission. 
Dean Boozang appears to believe that our prescription 
requires that all, or almost all, faculty, and students, should be 
Catholic.  That is not our position for a number of reasons, and 
we nowhere endorse any such view in the manuscript.  First, 
Dean Boozang and other commentators claim that there are 
many faculty who could be considered to be “Catholic 
intellectuals who subscribe to the tradition though not 
Catholic . . . .”159  That is an obvious fact that we acknowledge in 
the manuscript.  Thus, we argued that an excellent Catholic law 
school would also include non-Catholic, mission-fit faculty from 
other religious traditions, and none at all, because of the valuable 
and representative perspectives these faculty would bring to the 
school, its classrooms, its scholarship, and its public service. 
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Second, we made clear in the manuscript that the study of 
law is not like the study of theology in many ways.  Catholic 
theology is theology done by the Church, so only men and women 
incorporated into the Body of Christ have the capacity to do it.  
Only those men and women who have received the faith can 
attend to the task of theology which is “to understand the 
meaning of revelation” and so “illumine one or other aspect of the 
mysteries of faith.”160  There is nothing about law, legal 
scholarship, and teaching that requires the supernatural virtues 
and membership in the Church.161  Therefore, in principle, non-
Catholics may participate in a Catholic law school’s intellectual 
activities. 
Third, our core contention in the manuscript is that a critical 
mass of the faculty at a Catholic law school should be practicing 
Catholics, and that other non-Catholic faculty should be 
knowledgeable about and supportive of the school’s mission.  
Ideally, Catholic members of the faculty would not simply be 
Catholic in name only, or simply in their faith and religious 
practice, but Catholic intellectuals—men and women whose 
perspective on law is drawn from the Catholic intellectual 
tradition.  A critical mass of Catholic faculty is crucial because 
such faculty will, by virtue of their communion with the Church, 
likely have a disposition of loyalty to the Catholic intellectual 
tradition and some knowledge of it.  In this regard, our 
prescription parallels Professor Collett’s summary of the 
Church’s law governing the composition of Catholic university 
faculties.162  Ex Corde Ecclesiae and the USCCB’s Application of 
Ex Corde both require that a majority of faculty at Catholic 
universities be faithful Catholics.163  This is a commonsensical, 
practical approach to the problem of identity. 
 
160 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON THE 
ECCLESIAL VOCATION OF THE THEOLOGIAN DONUM VERITATIS ¶10 (1990). To be 
clear, we are not claiming that non-Catholic or non-Christian theologians would not 
add value to a Catholic theology department. We are claiming that they cannot 
perform the work of Catholic theology. 
161 Though they are valuable as all virtues are. 
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D. No Market, No Mission: The Impractical Nature of Authentic 
Catholic Legal Education  
Several of the commentators maintain that the vision of 
Catholic legal education we set forth in the manuscript is 
impractical and ultimately unworkable for two reasons.  These 
reasons concern the ability of authentic Catholic law schools to 
attract students interested in the school and to attract faculty 
capable of carrying forward the mission. 
First, the commentators argue that a law school that lives 
out an authentic Catholic mission, as we have described it, will 
be unable to attract a sufficient number of students to sustain 
the institution financially.  Dean Boozang bluntly states that 
“the business model of today’s law schools cannot support schools 
that adopt the vision urged by A Light Unseen.”164  She 
incorrectly suggests that our model for Catholic legal education 
“focus[es] exclusively on education by or of Catholic lawyers.”165  
Although we nowhere argue or imply that a genuine Catholic 
legal education should be limited to students who are Catholic in 
background, she nonetheless argues that the model she 
attributes to us is impractical.  
The economics of today’s law school market do not give most of 
us the luxury of intentionally recruiting a student body that is 
predominantly Catholic.  Nor do I think that this is a good idea.  
The value of the Catholic intellectual tradition is such that we 
should seek to teach it beyond those who self-identify as 
Catholic.166 
According to Boozang, “the law school market will [not] support 
more than a handful of schools that adhere to the model” set 
forth in the manuscript.167  She believes that 
[w]hile a core number of Catholic students will unquestionably 
be drawn to the kind of Catholic law school the authors 
describe, [she does] not believe a sufficient number of students 
qualified for success in law school and on the bar exist to 
support the over twenty law schools the authors urge to 
subscribe to this model.168   
The reason for this alleged lack of demand is that “[f]ew of 
today’s aspiring law students are sufficiently rigorously educated 
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in their faith to thrive at law schools that adopt the model 
advanced.”169  Indeed, she says that, combined with the effects of 
COVID-19, law schools following our model would “position 
themselves for the demographic cliff.”170 
Dean Rougeau likewise recognizes that “Catholic law schools 
need to survive in an intensely competitive higher education 
market” but that many are “struggling.”171  Given these 
circumstances, he fears that some Catholic schools “will not 
survive the current economic crisis and will likely close.”172  Like 
Boozang, he worries whether the distinctively Catholic law school 
that we describe “will have broad appeal to students who want 
the best possible legal education.”173  He suspects that the allure 
of a legal education through the lens of the Catholic tradition 
may not be appreciated by students with “more prosaic concerns” 
such as “limiting their educational debt and finding meaningful, 
reasonably remunerative employment.”174  Thus, he is “not fully 
convinced that [our proposal] provides the kind of [law 
school] . . . that will have broad appeal to students who want the 
best possible legal education.”175 
The second impracticality identified by the commentators is 
the dearth of a sufficient number of legal academics capable of 
carrying out the project.  Because the project of authentic 
Catholic legal education is intellectual in nature, it requires 
intellectuals to carry it out.  As Professor Richard Garnett notes, 
“any distinctiveness with respect to character and mission [of 
Catholic law schools] depends on personnel—administrators, 
staff, students, but especially faculty—who see that 
distinctiveness as something to be pursued, valued, and 
protected.”176  
Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski agrees with this assessment.  
He recalls the history—recounted in the book—when the 
proposal to reform Catholic legal education in the middle of the 
twentieth century failed in part because schools were unable to 
hire sufficient numbers of competent faculty.  According to 
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candidates to staff such a law school is even smaller, what with 
feeble catechesis, the waning institutional strength of the 
Church, and the increased secularization of American society and 
education.”177   
Dean Boozang is similarly pessimistic.  She “doubt[s] that a 
sufficient number of Catholic aspiring academics exist to staff all 
of the Catholic law schools in the country.”178  Just as there was a 
“paucity of professors” to carry on the mission in the past, so 
today there are few candidates “familiar with the Catholic 
intellectual tradition, [and] also qualified for whatever subject 
matter needs the particular law school has.”179 
Another practical limitation on the program of reform we 
propose almost goes unmentioned in the commentators’ remarks.  
This constraint stems not from the supply side of faculty talent, 
but the demand side.  Today, most established faculty at Catholic 
law schools “would be downright hostile, rather than merely 
indifferent, to reorientation around natural law jurisprudence 
and the broader Catholic intellectual tradition.”180  Amidst all the 
positive responses to the manuscript, and the many references by 
commentators to this program or that faculty member as 
evidence that their schools are in fact genuinely Catholic, 
Professor Pojanowski, his colleague Rick Garnett, and Teresa 
Collett are the only commentators with the candor to note the 
obvious: that many faculty regard a Catholic law school’s 
 
177 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Teaching Jurisprudence in a Catholic Law School, 58 
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  We do not contend that when a majority of a law school’s faculty members 
check the “practicing Catholic” box the school’s Catholic identity and the fulfillment 
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we offer this view because it does not exist. We do, however, predict that practicing 
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mission. Does anyone really believe otherwise? We also suggest, as a practical 
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formed in and have some knowledge of the Catholic intellectual tradition. Again, 
does Boozang or anyone else seriously contend that this is not the case? If so, they 
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180 Pojanowski, supra note 177, at 76. 
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distinctive mission as “an oddity to be hidden or an obstacle to be 
overcome.”181 
These are all serious challenges.  Because we offer our 
proposal as an actual program for reform, we are delighted that 
many of the commentators evaluated the practical viability of our 
prescription for authentic Catholic legal education.  A great idea 
for a product that has no market will not get made, and an 
excellent legal education without faculty or students will not 
thrive. 
First, with respect to faculty, we agree there is an 
insufficient number of mission-fit faculty to staff all existing law 
schools operating under Catholic auspices.  The “feeble 
catechesis, the waning institutional strength of the Church, and 
the increased secularization of American society and education” 
that Professor Pojanowski bemoans pose significant limitations 
on the pool of qualified faculty candidates.182  Demographically 
and statistically, it is unusual for a person to have the 
inclinations and opportunities to be knowledgeable about the 
Catholic intellectual tradition.  Few Americans attend Catholic 
schools from kindergarten to college, and the percentage of those 
who receive an academically excellent and orthodox education is 
smaller still.  Moreover, if a person wished to master the 
tradition on his or her own, it would be difficult without someone 
knowledgeable to encourage and guide such a quest.  Although 
many resources are available in print and online, there are few 
individuals who possess the initiative for such self-study.  Lastly, 
whereas most Americans up through the mid-twentieth century 
perceived Catholicism as only an oddity, today it is regarded as 
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positively wicked by many academics.  Both woke radicals and 
liberal progressives regard orthodox Christianity with disdain, as 
something to be spurned and shunned, its adherents 
“cancelled.”183  This public hostility to Catholicism hinders both 
interest in and mastery of the tradition. 
Intertwined with this problem is the lack of mission-driven 
Catholic law schools.184  In the manuscript we describe faculty 
hiring since the early-1970s as either not taking account of 
Catholic identity or taking it into account in a negative way.  The 
result is that today few law schools operating under Catholic 
auspices treat mission as a hiring-positive.185  And, as Professor 
Collett recounts, Catholic law faculty have a plausible reason to 
avoid being perceived by their peers as authentically Catholic 
because of the threat posed by adverse reputational 
consequences.186 
As things stand now, Catholic law students and lawyers who 
aspire to teach law typically avoid identifying themselves as 
Catholic to avoid giving faculty at existing schools a reason to 
reject their candidacy.  It is unclear how many other law 
students and lawyers never even try to become law professors 
because of the handicaps and barriers they suffer in the hiring 
process.  One indication that the hiring process currently filters 
out and disincentivizes Catholic faculty is the research by 
Professor James Lindgren, who has shown that Catholics are 
significantly underrepresented in the law professoriate.187 
Professor Collett argues that the problem caused by the lack 
of mission-fit faculty is exacerbated by the presence of mission-
 
183 Witness the attempt to remove John Finnis, one the most thoughtful and 
prolific Catholic philosophers of the twentieth century, from Oxford University 
simply for offering a rational defense of views grounded in Christian 
orthodoxy. See Harriet Sherwood, Oxford Students Call for Professor’s Removal over 
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hostile faculty on Catholic law faculties.188  She uses 
Georgetown’s faculty as an example and identifies a number of 
public advocates for non-Catholic positions on life and 
marriage.189  As Collett acknowledges, it is hard to generalize to 
the average Catholic law school,190 and this lack of information 
makes it difficult to predict with confidence the receptivity of 
existing faculty to mission-faculty hires.  However, insofar as the 
survey data summarized by Professor Collett from Professor 
Lindgren is accurate and applies to Catholic law school 
faculties,191 it suggests that the problem is acute.  Our first-hand 
and anecdotal knowledge of Catholic law school faculties fits this 
evidence.  That being said, there are numerous—we would 
conjecture dozens of—current law professors who would be 
mission-fit faculty at a Catholic law school.  That would be 
sufficient to provide a critical mass at a handful of the existing 
schools, but not much more. 
The willingness of law schools to be overt and unapologetic 
in their Catholic identity and thereby provide a market for 
mission-fit lawyers to become law professors would increase this 
modest supply.  Openly authentic Catholic law schools would 
incentivize law students and lawyers to opt into law teaching and 
identify themselves as mission-fit. 
Analogous to the lack of mission-fit faculty is the lack of 
mission-fit students.  As Professor Pojanowski summarizes, “[a]ll 
this and more applies to many students at Catholic law schools, 
who may be no better catechized or no more receptive to the 
Catholic intellectual tradition than the faculty and 
administration at would-be reforming schools.”192 
As we argued above, authentic Catholic legal education 
should take a variety of manifestations, some of which will be 
similar to existing law schools in many ways.  Even the most 
robust implementation of the tradition will not alter the “given” 
aspects of American law, legal practice, and legal education.  
This means that, from most students’ perspectives, there will be 
little to repel them, and from some students’ perspectives, there 
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will be aspects that attract them.  This conclusion is especially 
true if most law students are looking for the best overall law 
school “package” that will advance their career goals.  There is no 
reason to think that students would be put off by most 
implementations of the tradition, so long as the schools provide 
an effective pathway to the legal profession. 
In the end, our current view is that there are sufficient 
markets of faculty and students to demand a small number (in 
the low-single digits) of authentically Catholic law schools.  Dean 
Boozang shares this perspective because she believes that there 
is likely a market for “a handful” of mission-fit law schools.193 
Of the two market challenges—inadequate faculty and 
insufficient numbers of students—we believe the former is more 
pressing and harder to remedy.  Our argument is that Catholic 
legal education is at its core an intellectual enterprise 
characterized by engagement with the Catholic intellectual 
tradition.  Professors are the axial component because they carry 
on the intellectual life of the school in their teaching, scholarship, 
and mentoring.  Without a mission-oriented faculty, the tradition 
will have almost no impact on legal education.194 
At the same time, a dearth of mission-fit faculty is very 
difficult to remedy in the short and medium terms.  Persons with 
the inclination, skill, and knowledge to master one or more 
subjects of American law, become adept at legal scholarship, and 
to cultivate a working knowledge of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition and employ it in their work, is a tall order in the best of 
times.  And these are not the best of times for the Church, 
families, and educational institutions that have the capacity to 
form such people. 
II.  SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR 
PROPOSAL 
Many of the symposium participants agreed with our basic 
thesis that Catholic legal education has a “need for more explicit 
curricular and scholarly integration of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition.”195  These contributions highlighted in greater detail 
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the practical means whereby this basic thesis might be 
implemented.  We deeply appreciate these helpful, practical 
proposals, both as evidence of what has and hasn’t worked in our 
manuscript and as catalysts for us to bring our proposal into 
sharper resolution.  
A. Teaching Jurisprudence and Meeting Students Where They 
Are 
Professor Uelmen insists that Catholic legal education today 
must meet students where they are.  As she sees it, “the most 
urgent task for Catholic law schools is to help students reflect on 
the question of how to make the connection between the difficult 
cultural social, and institutional questions that they will face as 
attorneys, in the light of critical reflection on their own deep 
values systems.”196  Her remarks build off a quotation in the 
manuscript from Rev. Robert J. Henle, S.J., then Georgetown’s 
president, who in 1971 observed that students no longer come to 
college grounded in the faith such that the task of Catholic 
colleges and universities is “to reestablish the faith, to 
reestablish their belief, to help young people find and internalize 
a sound system of values for themselves.”197  This has much in 
common with the themes of personal “encounter” and 
“accompaniment” that have echoed throughout Pope Francis’s 
pontificate.198   
Dean Boozang helpfully explains that Catholic law schools 
can meet students where they are by engaging them with the 
tradition both directly and indirectly.199  She encourages Catholic 
law faculty to teach “through the prism of the Catholic 
intellectual tradition without naming it Catholic in the 
classroom.”200  Boozang is correct that not all engagement with 
the tradition need be overt.   Some classes and faculty members 
may explicitly engage the tradition, while other classes and 
faculty may introduce students to aspects of the tradition in an 
indirect manner.  For example, drawing upon a body of 
ecclesiastical documents that frequently cite to the Bible and the 
writings of the saints, a class on Catholic Social Thought would 
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naturally be explicit in its engagement.  By contrast a first-year 
course in Contracts may only implicitly engage the tradition.201  
Furthermore, following Dean Boozang’s advice, the way in which 
a law school may engage the tradition may depend on the 
composition of its student body.  At the same time, a Catholic law 
school that meets its students where they are should not use the 
excuse of a diverse student body to render the tradition so 
nondescript and indirect that the faculty and students do not 
actually engage with it.202 
Professor Pojanowski explains that his teaching of 
Jurisprudence has been influenced by his encounter with 
different kinds of students and his efforts to meet them where 
they are.  In his contribution to the symposium Pojanowski 
describes how he arrived at his admittedly indirect approach to 
teaching this required course at Notre Dame.  Although Notre 
Dame has many students who are attracted to the school 
specifically because of its Catholic mission, some students resent 
having to take the course.203  He sees his Jurisprudence students 
as falling into three general categories: those who are firmly 
committed to the tradition; those who are open to what the 
course has to offer; and those students who see the course as a 
waste of time having no practical value.204  Professor Pojanowski 
experimented with different versions of the course hoping to 
reach students in the latter two categories.205  He is aware that 
“[w]ith nonjudgmentalism, casual emotivism, and ‘you do you’ 
ensconced as leading doctrines of our day, invoking a universal 
moral order or objective truth about human flourishing is 
decidedly countercultural” and unlikely to persuade.206   
Ultimately he arrived at a structure that indirectly seeks to 
convey to students the course’s thesis “without bullying or 
propagandizing”: that the natural law tradition provides the 
most accurate and attractive way of thinking about our legal 
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system and practice.207  This indirect presentation is achieved 
through posing a question: “Do we believe there is, in fact, a 
moral reality out there framing our deliberation about first-order 
questions of justice and second-order questions about who ought 
to answer them and how?”208  This course structure is realistic 
and effective, working to meet the needs of all of Professor 
Pojanowski’s students, while introducing them to the natural law 
tradition.209    
B. Anthropology and Teaching Students the Layers of Law 
The human person stands at the center of any plausible 
theory of law.  After all, the human person is the author, the 
subject, the interpreter, and the enforcer of the laws that govern 
human society.  A number of other views of human nature—
grounded in materialism,210 mind-body dualism,211 expressive 
individualism,212 hedonism, and moral relativism—are pervasive 
in Western culture and dominant in American legal education.  
Thus, one of the central claims we make in the manuscript is 
that, to fulfill the common mission they all share, Catholic law 
schools must introduce students to a Catholic anthropology. 
Professor Garnett agrees that “the foundation and 
cornerstone of [Catholic law schools’ intellectual] architecture 
needs to be a distinctively Christian moral ‘anthropology.’ ”213  In 
his contribution, Professor Garnett lays out, in preliminary 
fashion, how a Catholic anthropology would be present 
throughout the teaching of law at the law school.214  Garnett 
describes how the study of law involves four layers of 
comprehension.  The first layer includes the posited data of law, 
such as statutes and cases and gaining a familiarity with the 
language of law—the jargon that lawyers regularly employ in 
conducting their craft.  The second layer involves a knowledge of 
legal doctrine and the tools of legal analysis for understanding 
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posited legal materials (such as cases and statutes), as well as 
non-posited materials (such as judge-formulated tests) that 
inhabit the legal system.  The third layer is the stage of fit and 
justification, where students learn to identify a given law’s point 
and purpose, and engage in normative and logical critique.  The 
fourth and final layer is where students make “the connection 
between our human nature and the legal enterprise,” where the 
fact of our nature makes law’s import known.215   
There is a tremendous amount packed into Professor 
Garnett’s four-layered approach, and we cannot do justice to all 
of its implications in this response.  Here, however, we briefly 
note four important implications.  First, these four levels operate 
(simultaneously) in all major facets of legal education: teaching, 
student character formation, and faculty scholarship.  For 
instance, a classroom teacher, when pedagogically appropriate, 
should address not just the subject’s key posited law, or its un-
posited techniques, or the possible justifications for that 
particular body of law.  An excellent teacher in a Catholic law 
school will also raise and engage the question of whether and 
how law’s point is tied to who we are as human persons living in 
community. 
Second, the various levels Garnett identifies are reflexive so 
that change at one level puts pressure on the other levels to fit 
the change.  For instance, a change in the meaning of “life” or 
“person” in the text of the Constitution at level one will put 
pressure on level four and vice versa.216    
Third, Professor Garnett’s structure fits well with our focal 
case analysis of Catholic legal education.217  Many Catholic law 
schools do an excellent job at levels one and two, and some 
appear to touch on level three—from both Catholic and non-
Catholic perspectives.  To the extent, however, that the fourth 
level is not engaged or is not engaged with resources from the 
tradition, as appears to be the case for most Catholic law 
schools—to that extent, a Catholic law school will have fallen 
short of its mission. 
Fourth, the foundational level of Professor Garnett’s 
analysis, the fourth layer of Catholic anthropology, includes 
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aspects that are properly natural and supernatural, and this 
latter aspect is not present in the current manuscript and 
requires additional consideration.  Following Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Professor Garnett describes the key characteristics of the human 
person as being dependent, relational, and rational.218  This 
claim, while central to the tradition, is not uniquely Catholic, or 
even religious.  It is a claim that is open to natural inspection.  
As such, law students of every background should be open to 
serious consideration of this theory of human nature.  
However, Professor Garnett also adds a fourth characteristic: 
“loved.”219  Following Nicholas Wolterstorff, Garnett believes that 
what makes human dignity a fact “is that we are loved by 
God.”220  It is this aspect of our humanity that “provides a strong 
account, not only of the what, but also of the why, of dignity, of 
rights, and of justice—of the point of law.”221  For Garnett “[i]t is 
not our capacities and abilities but our being-loved” that is the 
source of human dignity.222 
We agree, of course, that being loved by God is an essential 
characteristic of being human.  Indeed, “man would not exist 
were he not created by God[’]s love and constantly preserved by 
it,”223 and we appreciate the Church’s warning that “[w]hen God 
is forgotten . . . the creature itself grows unintelligible.”224  
Moreover, we acknowledge that justice secured under the rule of 
law is not sufficient for a harmonious society, that something 
more is needed—solidarity, friendship, love—“in order to keep 
the world going.”225 
Still, we believe that the emphasis in Catholic legal 
education should remain on the other dimensions of a Catholic 
anthropology.   The nature of human beings as rational animals 
gives the dignity of the human person a sound philosophical 
explanation that Catholic law schools should employ.  John 
Finnis nicely summarizes this position: “the essence and powers 
of the soul seem to be given to each individual complete (as 
wholly undeveloped, radical capacities) at the outset of his or her 
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existence as such.  And this is the root of the dignity we all have 
as human beings.”226  We believe this emphasis permits the legal 
system and Catholic legal education to retain their proper 
autonomy from theology.  In particular, it maintains our claim 
that our proposal that Catholic legal education is and should be 
distinctive through its use of the Catholic intellectual tradition is 
properly philosophical and jurisprudential in nature, and not 
theological.  Maintenance of this distinction fits well with the 
tradition’s consideration of law and with American legal practice.  
Furthermore, maintaining the philosophical character of our 
proposal ensures that faculty at Catholic law schools need not 
possess the theological virtues that only Christians may receive. 
We offer this slightly expanded way of agreeing with 
Professor Garnett’s incorporation of being loved into the Catholic 
anthropology that undergirds Catholic legal education.  God’s 
providence of creation operates through many means.  God’s love 
is the cause of everything, including the existence of human 
beings.  God’s love is therefore the final cause of the life of every 
human being and of humanity as a whole.  At the same time, God 
is also our formal cause.  God continually loves us into being, and 
he also formed each of us individually at a discrete moment in 
time, in cooperation with our parents, through the rational soul 
He gave to each of us.  The nature of human beings as rational 
animals gives the dignity of the human person a sound 
philosophical explanation that Catholic law schools should 
employ.   
Professor Garnett’s summary of the key aspects of the 
structure of law and legal education, and especially of Catholic 
anthropology that forms the foundation for a distinctive Catholic 
legal education, is attractive.  We believe our incorporation of it 
is accurate because it acknowledges the fact of human dignity 
and it identifies a sound, widely accessible basis for that dignity.  
Our anthropology maintains our proposal’s natural orientation so 
it can fit within American legal practice, and it does not require 
from faculty or students the theological virtue of faith. 
C. The History and Role of Clinics in Catholic Legal Education 
Clinics, clinics, clinics!  As we workshopped A Light Unseen, 
presented it at symposia and conferences, and discussed it with 
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friends and colleagues, we regularly heard a version of the 
following claim: Catholic law schools today are Catholic in large 
part because of their clinical offerings.  Several contributors to 
the St. John’s symposium offered the same argument.  Dean 
Vischer claims that the manuscript conveys “a rather dismissive 
attitude toward Catholic law schools’ embrace of clinical legal 
education as a case of bandwagon jumping.”227  Dean Boozang 
repeatedly references Seton Hall’s clinics, the “Center for Social 
Justice,” as a key situs where students learn about “justice and 
the common good.”228 
The claim we make in the manuscript is that the historical 
record provides little evidence that Catholic law schools 
established clinics to fulfill their Catholic mission.229  Nor is there 
evidence that more than a handful of clinics are operated 
distinctly, using the tradition’s resources.  Moreover, the subject 
areas addressed in the clinics operated at Catholic law schools—
poverty and public assistance, child and family law, immigration, 
criminal defense, and veterans’ benefits—while deserving of 
attention, are the same as those at their secular counterparts.  
With few exceptions, Catholic law school clinics do not serve 
clients or causes that are counter-cultural in a Catholic sense.230   
 
227 Vischer, supra note 3, at 118. 
228 Boozang, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
229 Amy Uelmen says that “it is something of a sand trap to focus the narrative 
on the search for explicitly religious justifications.” Uelmen, supra note 118, at 111.  
If by this she means that continued efforts to discover a Catholic motivation and 
justification for clinics will be futile, we agree. An honest review of the historical 
record will not yield a different result. She suggests that some other method, an “x-
ray” might show the religious origin of clinics at Catholic law schools. Id. The idea is 
that a deep Catholic identity lurks behind these clinics, it just isn’t visible to the 
naked eye. We make clear our skepticism for this claim above.  See supra notes 92–
99 and accompanying text. 
230 A number of secular law schools host clinical programs and centers dedicated 
to “reproductive rights.” See, e.g., Reproductive Justice Clinic and Advance 
Reproductive Justice Clinic, N.Y.U., http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics/ 
semester/reprojustice [https://perma.cc/H37L-LVM6] (last visited June 30, 2021); 
Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L., 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/center-on-reproductive-rights-and-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/D38M-R288] (last visited June 30, 2021);  Pro Bono Requirement 
Option, If/When/How: Lawyering for Reproductive Justice, UNIV. PENN. SCH. L. 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/probonoprojects/reproductive-rights/current-projects.php 
[https://perma.cc/RLX9-H2AB] (last visited June 30, 2021).  Of the country’s twenty-
nine Catholic law schools, only one hosts a clinic dedicated to the pro-life cause. See 
University of St. Thomas Prolife Center, https://www.stthomas.edu/prolifecenter/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZW8M-2QD] (last visited June 30, 2021). Notre Dame recently 
began a Religious Liberty Initiative including a clinic. See Religious Liberty 
Initiative, UNIV. NOTRE DAME L. SCH., https://law.nd.edu/religious-liberty/ 
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There is, however, ample evidence that Catholic law schools 
established clinics for the pedagogical benefits to their students 
and as a response to market pressures, so it is not surprising 
that they are operated like non-Catholic law school clinics.  As we 
argued above, having a clinic is good and valuable, and all 
Catholic law schools should host them.  They can help students 
acquire invaluable skills essential to legal practice and learn 
what it means to take on the heavy, personal responsibility of 
representing a client.231  At the same time, we maintain that 
hosting clinics alone is insufficient evidence of authentic Catholic 
education.   
CONCLUSION 
American Catholic legal education has recently celebrated its 
150th anniversary.  From the small seeds planted in the Indiana 
wilderness near South Bend to today’s numerous, respected, and 
influential law schools that span the country—from Manhattan 
to San Diego, from Washington state to Florida—a lot has 
changed.  But, on a fundamental level, one aspect has remained 
the same: Catholic legal education needs an intellectual 
architecture to live up to its promise and fulfill its mission to 
bring the light of Christ to the legal profession.  The Catholic law 
school deans and faculty who commented on A Light Unseen have 
provided valuable constructive criticism and commentary, and 
the book will be significantly better for it.   
 
 
[https://perma.cc/Q772-5HAK] (last visited June 30, 2021). One Catholic school 
recently launched a clinic dedicated to LGBT rights. Lincoln LGBTQ+ Rights Clinic, 
GONZ. UNIV. SCH. L., https://www.gonzaga.edu/school-of-law/clinic-centers/law-clinic 
/lgbtq-rights-clinic [https://perma.cc/ZN57-B2KR] (last visited June 30, 2021). 
231 With respect to educating students in professional ethics, Professor Carmella 
cautions us that “character and virtue alone do not equip individuals to navigate 
ethically in certain circumstances” such as, when the lawyer’s workplace incentives 
are not aligned with what is ethical. Carmella, supra note 8, at 27. We imagine that 
a Catholic law school’s professional training program would take this insight on 
board, and that its clinics and simulations would present students with situations of 
tension between the students’ ethical responsibilities and their workplace.   
